Genocide, the United Nations, and the Death of Absolute Rights by O\u27Donnell, Michael J
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 7
5-1-2003
Genocide, the United Nations, and the Death of
Absolute Rights
Michael J. O'Donnell
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School.
For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. O'Donnell, Genocide, the United Nations, and the Death of Absolute Rights, 23 B.C. Third
World L.J. 399 (2003), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol23/iss2/7
GENOCIDE, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND 
THE DEATH OF ABSOLUTE RIGHTS 
MICHAEL]' O'DONNELL* 
E\EWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
RWANDA. By Michael Barnett. Ithaca and London: Cornell Univer-
sity Press 2002. Pp. 181. 
Abstract: This Book Review uses Michael Barnett's argument that the 
United Nations (UN) refrained from intervening to stop the Rwandan 
genocide out of considered self-interest as a case-study through which to 
examine whether absolute rights exist in practice. The UN's actions in 
Rwanda represent a staggering failure to protect absolute rights, 
namely, the Rwandan people's right to freedom from genocide. The 
Rwandan case-study demonstrates that absolute rights, which have an 
impressive pedigree in legal and philosophical scholarship, are nothing 
more than a theoretical ideal-they are non-existent in practice. 
Nonetheless, there are hopeful signs, such as the international 
community's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, that absolute rights need not 
be "dead" as a useful concept. In order to maintain relevance as 
practical, as opposed to normative, ideals, absolute rights must be given 
greater priority in policymaking, allowing the existing, powerful regime 
of human rights law to prevent future absolute rights catastrophes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the most clear-cut case of genocide since the Holocaust 
took place in Rwanda, in which some 800,000 people were killed in a 
span of roughly 100 days.l Mter decades of conflict between the coun-
try's majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations, the early 1990s in 
Rwanda witnessed an ongoing civil war, an economic crisis, and the 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ThIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2002-2003). My sincere 
thanks go to Liz Chacko, Erin Han, Irene Kim, and Michelle Picheny for their thoughtful 
comments and suggestions during drafts of this paper. This paper is dedicated to my wife, 
Mary. 
1 MICHAEL BARNETI', EYEWI'INESS TO A GENOCIDE: ThE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 
1 (2002); SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
362 (2002). Of the six genocides Power chronicles in the twentieth century, none caused 
more deaths than the Holocaust, in which it is estimated that six million Jews were lost. See, 
e.g., Max Frankel, 150th Anniversary: 1851-2001; Turning Away from the Holocaust, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at H9. 
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growing pains of multi-party democratization after nearly twenty years 
of single-party rule by the Hutu.2 The establishment of a Tutsi-Ied op-
position party led first to civil unrest, and then to spontaneous massa-
cres by Hutu extremists bent on creating an ethnically pure Rwanda.!! 
The death of Hutu presidentJuvenal Habyarimana by plane crash on 
the evening of April 6, 1994 provided the spark that ignited this tin-
der box of tension and conflict; within hours, the Hutu Presidential 
Guard, the Interahamwe, set up roadblocks and began targeting and 
killing Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu by the thousands.4 Mter 
two weeks of civilian massacre, the United Nations Security Council, 
which had established a peacekeeping force in Rwanda in 1993, with-
drew all but a nominal presence of its forces from Rwanda, allowing 
the genocide to proceed unchecked.5 
In Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Michael 
Barnett, a political officer at the United States (U .S.) Mission to the 
United Nations from 1993-94, reconstructs the history of the Rwan-
dan genocide as it was experienced by decision makers in the UN.6 In 
a search for moral accountability, Barnett investigates a communica-
tion breakdown between the UN's force on the ground in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), the UN Secretariat, and the Security Council, which led 
to the peacekeeping force's withdrawal at the moment it was urgently 
needed and its failure to return until the fighting had ended.' 
2 BARNE'IT, supra note 1, at 54-56. Barnett criticizes the widespread perception among 
policymakers and the media during the genocide that conflict between Hutu and Tutsi was 
an inevitable result of a centuries-old tribal conflict, proffering instead the view that ethnic 
tensions were largely the result of Belgium's colonial practice of conferring political and 
economic power on the minority Thtsi because of their Caucasoid physical features. Id. at 
50-51; see alsoJoNATIIAN GLOVER, HUMANI'1Y: A MORAL HIS'IORY OF TIlE TwENTIETIl CEN-
'JURY 121 (1999). 
8 BARNE'IT, supra note 1, at 54. 
• See itt. at 97. By that time, the now-infamous Milles Collines Radio, which broadcast 
hate speech, incitements to attack civilians, and the names and addresses of Thtsi and 
policitally moderate Hutu, had been established by the far-right Committee for the De-
fense of the Republic party. Id. at 54; see also PHILLIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH 'IO INFORM 
You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: S'IORmS FROM RWANDA 
99-100 (1998). 
5 BARNE'IT, supra note 1, at 127. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) was established on October 5, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 872, to 
facilitate the implementation of a cease-fire between the warring factions. Id. at 72. 
6Id. at ix, 4-5. 
7 See id. at 109. Barnett argues that the Secretariat failed to convey to the Security 
Council two crucial pieces of information it received from its force commander, Romeo 
Dallaire. Id. First was a characterization of the events on the ground as ethnic cleansing 
and genocide, rather than simply the chaos of civil war. BARNE'IT, supra note 1, at 109. 
Second was Dallaire's consistent pleading for troop reinforcements; all that was necessary 
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Barnett concludes that the UN bears some moral responsibility 
for the Rwandan genocide.s His provocative explanation for the Sec-
retariat's troubling behavior has grave implications for the modern 
notion of human rights that the Secretariat understood perfectly the 
implications of the terrible information it received from the ground 
and decided to withdraw the bulk of its troops anyway.9 Specifically, 
Barnett suggests that the Secretariat was mindful of the cost of an-
other failed attempt at peace enforcement so soon after the UN's very 
public failure in Somalia and consequently withheld information 
from the Security Council, denying it the moral ammunition to or-
ganize a more concerted effort to stop the massacre. IO The Secretar-
to stop the mounting violence, he argued, was a litde saber ratding, as demonstrated by 
the cessation of violence in Kigali every time foreign troops protected their nationals dur-
ing evacuations. Seeid. at 109-10. 
S [d. at 155, 174. Barnett's conclusion is based not on the UN's failure to predict the 
Rwandan genocide, but rather its failure to interrupt the genocide once it had started. [d. at 
155. Barnett's appraisal is more generous in its acquittal of the UN for failing to prevent 
the genocide than the UN has been toward itself. See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUN-
CIL, REpORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY IN'IO THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999) [hereinafter UN 
REpORT]. Barnett focuses on the UN, and not member states, because of its ability, and 
responsibility, to disseminate information that would have given member states the moral 
and political opportunity to act. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 174. Nonetheless, Barnett re-
serves harsh criticism for member states, particularly the U.S. and France. [d. at 171-72; see 
also POWER, supra note 1, at 382 (focusing on the role of the United States in thwarting the 
Security Council's ability to stop the Rwandan massacre). 
9 BARNETT, supra note 1, at 118. Barnett candidly admits that there is not enough evi-
dence to prove his argument definitively; thus, he proffers the possibility that the Secretar-
iat misread the complex series of events in Rwanda and subsequendy gave insufficient 
weight to what appear in hindsight to be clear indicia of catastrophe. See id. at 111-12. 
Barnett's principled evaluation of the UN's actions in context, rather than in hindsight, 
makes this a conclusion of some appeal: for years the UN had dealt with a Rwanda torn by 
civil war and acted within the constraints of a mandate that was not to exceed helping the 
fighting parties maintain a cease-fire. See id. at 112. Ethnic violence was a hallmark of the 
country since the 1960s and, to an extent, had desensitized UN officials to what otherwise 
would have been seen as genocidal killings. [d. at 112-13. In short, to UN policymakers 
unfamiliar with the nuances of Rwandan politics, an ancient tribal hatred had simply re-
surfaced and the Hutu and Tutsi were "at it again.' See id. 
10 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 123-24, 174. The UN as peacekeeper came under 
heavy criticism after the October 3-4, 1993 incident in which a failed raid by U.S. Army 
Rangers on Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu led to the deaths of 
eighteen U.S. soldiers, one of whom was dragged through the streets by an angry mob. [d. 
at 34-37. The U.S. blamed the UN for the incident, and relations between the two became 
"positively poisonous.' [d. at 163. Somalia represents the nadir of a critical era for the UN 
as an institution, one in which its peacekeeping function dramatically increased to meet 
the needs created by globalization in the early post..cold War era. [d. at 24, 29. Lukewarm 
successes and outright failures in this new role had led to criticism by member states and 
even an internal fear for the body's continued existence. [d. at 37, 163. 
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iat, Barnett argues, essentially weighed the options-ending a geno-
cide by giving the Security Council information that could lead to ac-
tion or saving the UN from potential self-destruction by sitting out the 
politically untenable conflict in Rwanda-and chose what it perceived 
to be the imperative.ll 
. This Book Review uses Barnett's argument that the UN refrained 
from intervening in Rwanda out of self-interest as a case-study 
through which to examine whether absolute rights exist in contempo-
rary international practice. Absolute rights are the bedrock of liberal 
political theory and the cornerstone of the human rights movemen t.12 
They are fundamental guarantees of basic human rights that may 
never be transgressed-a "floor" for all human behaviorY' Thus, evi-
dence of their erosion or outright disappearance threatens the very 
existence of a protective human rights regime.H Barnett's disquieting 
hypothesis provides such evidence. IT the UN, that great hope for 
humanity to rise from the ashes of the Holocaust and World War II, 
was willing to sacrifice its obligations to protect absolute rights out of 
a calculated interest in self-preservation, what can be expected from 
the rest of the world's polities? And if states and intergovernmental 
institutions can so easily abandon their duties to protect absolute 
rights, where does that leave the human rights movement as it enters 
the twenty-first century? 
Part I of this analysis briefly introduces the theoretical underpin-
nings of absolute rights in philosophical and legal discourse. Part II 
identifies, through an extended syllogism, the UN's failure to inter-
vene in Rwanda as a case in which absolute rights were not protected. 
Part ill examines the implications of this failure to bridge theory and 
practice for the modern human rights movement by placing the 
Rwandan case-study into context. Part ITI also responds to the asser-
tion that human rights law's chief benefits are its indirect protections 
by arguing that the moral urgency presented by absolute rights viola-
11 See BARNETT, supra note I, at 11B. Barnett supports this troubling possibility with 
evidence of behavior by the Secretariat that indicated its opposition to increased interven-
tion and the Secretariat's motive of institutional self-preservation to hide the truth. See id. 
at 118-22. In particular, Barnett accuses the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, of 
failing to make either the moral case for intervention, as he had made to halt the 1992 
famine in Somalia, or the logistical case that proponents of an increased UNAMIR force in 
the Security Council required for action. Id. at 119-20. 
12 See discussion infra Part I. 
IS See discussion infra Part I. 
14 See discussion infra Part I. 
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tions requires a continuing effort for their immediate and direct pro-
tection. I5 
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL THEORY BEHIND 
ABSOLUTE RIGHTS 
Barnett's account of the UN raises the notion of absolute rights, 
also referred to in the international law context as non-derogable 
rights.l6 Either moniker embodies the well-defined philosophical and 
legal ideal that some rights are so fundamental that they must never 
be compromised, regardless of con text,l7 A necessary corollary to the 
notion of absolute rights is that they must be protected in order to 
have practical, in addition to normative, value. IS In the case of the UN 
and Rwanda, such protection entailed a positive duty to prevent rights 
violations, rather than a negative duty to refrain from violating 
rights. 19 
A. Philosophical Theory of Absolute Rights 
Much has been written from a philosophical perspective on the 
notion of absolute rights, which find their roots in natural law. 20 Two 
distinct schools of thought dominate political ethics on the subject.21 
The classical liberal ethics, usually attributed to Immanuel Kant and 
echoed most prominently in the writings of the modern scholar John 
15 See Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference', 2 CHI. J. 
INT'L L. 121, 122 (2001). 
16 See, e.g., Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Ju-
risprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 101, 102 (1995) (defining non-derogable rights as 
"those specially protected rights under treaty law that cannot be limited or suspended, 
notwithstanding any political crisis that the state faces"). Non-derogable rights' power as a 
practical legal mechanism exists in their status as inalienable norms of international law. 
See Theodoor C. van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 45 (Karel Vasak ed., Phillip Alston trans., 1982). In 
other words, even in times of emergency, non-derogable rights may not be suspended. See 
id. at 48. 
17 See discussion infra Part II. A-B. 
18 See James Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 77, 80 (1993). Professor Nickel has differentiated between the positive and nega-
tive duties of third parties where individuals' rights are concerned. ld. For instance, the 
right to freedom from torture includes both a duty not to torture individuals (negative) 
and the duty to protect individuals from torture (positive). ld. 
19 See id. 
20 See Richard Tuck, The Dangers of Natural Rights, 20 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 683,683, 
686-87 (1997). 
21 ld. at 683. 
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Rawles, argue that certain rights are above compromise and hence 
can never be bargained away even on behalf of pressing diplomatic or 
political interests.22 Such rights are, as political theorist Isaiah Berlin 
put it, "absolute barriers to the imposition of one man's will on an-
other."23 The opposing, utilitarian viewpoint is credited to legal theo-
rist Jeremy Bentham and expressed in the contemporary writings of 
Professor Sande1.24 Utilitarianism stands for the proposition that noth-
ing is absolute, which tends to undermine the existence of fundamen-
tal rights.25 Under this theory, if the greater good can be achieved by 
sacrificing the rights of one to benefit many, then the social utility of 
that action demands such a sacrifice.26 
B. Legal Theory of Absolute Rights 
In the context of human rights law, absolute or non-derogable 
rights have been labeled jus cogens norms, fundamental rights, supra-
positive rights, elementary rights, and basic rights.27 One commenta-
tor has defined these rights as the foundation of the international 
communityrights so certain that they need not be accepted by subjects 
of law to retain their power.28 A number of legal instruments expressly 
recognize this exaltation of certain human rights to absolute statuS.29 
For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
is one of many human rights treaties that enumerates non-derogable 
rights, including the right to freedom from torture and slavery, and 
the right to be recognized as a person before the law.30 
22 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF '!HE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(1785);jOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
28 IsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 166 (1969). 
24 See generally JEREMY BEN'!HAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO '!HE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (1789); MICHAEL j. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND '!HE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
(1982). 
25 See Tuck, supra note 20, at 683. 
26 See id. 
27 Van Boven, supra note 16, at 43; Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Hu-
man Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1986). Jus cogens, or peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, are defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as 
"accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as [norms] 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 V.N.T.S. 331, 344 (entered 
into force jan. 27,1980). 
28 Van Boven, supra note 16, at 43. 
29ld. 
go ld. at 45; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999 V.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
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An important debate exists in the human rights community over 
whether the enumeration and protection of absolute rights fragments 
the power of human rights law.:n Professor Meron argues that such a 
distinction necessarily leaves behind a class of inferior, second-class 
rights, which apparently may be compromised if the competing im-
perative is great enough.32 This Book Review's practical answer to the 
"second-class rights" argument is that the moral urgency of prevent-
ing absolute rights violations such as the Rwandan genocide warrants 
their separate classification, if fundamental stature can result in their 
protection, regardless of the effects on human rights theory.33 
II. THE NON-ExISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE RIGHTS IN THE UN's RESPONSE 
TO THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
If the theoretical ideal of absolute or non-derogable rights is that 
certain human rights are above compromise, then the practical mani-
festation of that ideal is the moral imperative that absolute rights 
should always be protected.34 The UN's failure to protect the Rwan-
dan people from genocide, according to Barnett's argument, was 
based on a conscious determination by the Secretariat to put institu-
tional interests above humanitarian ones.35 If this argument is correct, 
the UN's behavior would represent a classic utilitarian action that im-
plicitly rejects absolute rights.36 
Assuming a priori the veracity of Barnett's argument, the UN's 
behavior can be evaluated in the form of a five-part syllogism:37 if A) 
genocide violates an absolute right, and B) it is the UN's duty to pre-
8) See Meron, supra note 27, at 21-22. 
82 See id. 
88 See id. That this response to the "second-class rights" theory is essentially a utilitarian 
argumen t is not lost on this author. See id. Yet Professor Meron's theoretical "split" in the 
human rights community by the creation of second-class rights does not necessarily extend 
beyond the page. See id. From the mere existence and enumeration of fundamental rights, 
it need not follow that non-fundamental rights are less enthusiastically supported by hu-
man rights advocates or more enthusiastically abrogated by rights violators. See Meron, 
supra note 27, at 21. Indeed, Professor Meron himself ultimately subscribes to the moral 
principle that certain, but not all, rights are beyond compromise: he argues for the careful 
expansion of non-derogable rights to a more concrete class. See id. 
84 See Nickel, supra note 18, at 80. Berlin, in his description of the natural law tradition, 
suggests this bridge from theory to practice: "[In order to preserve one's liberty, one] must 
establish a society in which there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should 
be permitted to cross .... Genuine belief in the inviolability of a minimum extent of indi-
vidual liberty entails some such absolute stand." BERLIN, supra note 23, at 164-65. 
85 See supra note 9. 
86 See supra note 9. 
87 See supra note 9. 
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vent such a violation, and C) there were available legal mechanisms by 
which the UN could have acted, and D) the UN, aware of the situa-
tion, did not act to protect the absolute right, choosing instead an-
other course of action, then E) the UN's behavior is evidence of a fail-
ure to protect absolute rights.3s 
A Does Genocide Violate an Absolute Right 7 
Genocide is the most heinous crime that can be committed 
against a human population.39 In the famous words of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, genocide "shocks the conscience of mankind."4O A 
mandate for its prevention and punishment has been enshrined in a 
widely-ratified multilateral treaty.41 Genocide's status as a jus eogen, or 
customary norm of in ternational law from which no derogation is 
permitted under any circumstances, is broadly accepted.42 
Commentators have suggested that any list of absolute rights 
should be short and relatively abstract. 43 It nearly goes without saying 
that the right of a people to be free from wholesale slaughter would 
top any such list.44 Given the near-universal consensus that the taking 
of innocent life is a moral wrong, genocide stands alone as a wrong 
!IS See discussion infra Parts IT.A-D. 
39 See UN REpORT, supra note 8, at 5. 
40 GoA Res. 96(1), U.N. GAOR, Ist Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. Al64/ Add.l (1947). 
41 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened 
Jorsip;natureDec.9, 1948, art. 1,78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [here-
inafter Genocide Convention]. There are currently 134 state parties to the' Genocide Con-
vention. UNITED NATIONS TREA'IY COLLECTION: STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES DE-
POSITED WITII TIlE SECRETARY GENERAL, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISH/bible / englishin ternationalbible/ part! / chapterIV / treaty l.asp (last visited Feb. 
24,2003). The Genocide Convention is one of the few human rights treaties to which the 
U.S. has given domestic force through enabling legislation. See Genocide Convention Im-
plementation Act, 18 USC § 1091 (1987) (amended 1994); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of 
US &tification oJlnternationalHuman mghts Treaties, 1 CHI.J.INT'L L. 347, 348-49 (2000). 
42 See, e.g., James D. Fry, Note, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The 
Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN An. 169, 187-88 (2002) 
(observing that the prohibition of genocide as a jus cogen under customary international 
law is unambiguous). 
48 See Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human mghts, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 38 (Ste-
phen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). 
44 See id. Despite a healthy ongoing discourse on the relative importance of individual 
rights versus group rights, see, e.g., Peter Rosenblum, Teaching Human mghts: Ambivalent 
Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 301, 306-07 
(2002), a cogent argument could be made that the prohibition against the unique crime 
of genocide merely magnifies the protection of existing individual rights according to 
their status in relation to groups. Seevan Boven, supra note 16, at 54. 
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that actually multiplies a wrong, magnifying its infamy.45 The essence 
of genocide's power is that it denies the very right to exist to entire 
groups of people based solely upon their identity, making it at once 
selective in practice and universal in scope.46 
Given genocide's legal and moral opprobrium, if freedom from it 
cannot be enumerated as an absolute right, then absolute rights do 
not exist.47 
B. Is It the UN's Duty to Prevent Genocide? 
The existence of an absolute right begs the practical question, 
who will protect that right?48 In the case of protecting the Rwandan 
people from genocide, Barnett argues that the UN, and not powerful 
member states, bears the responsibility.49 Member states could at least 
conceivably have denied a duty to act on behalf of others whose suf-
fering in a far away land had little to do with their immediate inter-
ests.50 Yet such suffering fell directly under the purview of the United 
Nations.51 As the "bureaucratic arm of the world's transcendental val-
ues," the UN was in a position to frame the Rwandan crisis in a way 
that would have allowed the Security Council to vote for interven-
tion.52 There is legal support for this policy argument. One of the 
UN's enumerated purposes is "[t]o achieve international co-operation 
in solving international problems of a[] ... humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights. "53 The 
UN, the central actor in the international community's "moral divi-
sion of labor," was thus ideally situated to appreciate and respond to 
the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda.54 
45 See Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns Be Brought to Justicer The Crime of Genocide's Evolu-
tion and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 257, 262-65 (2002). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
49 BARNETT, supra note 1, at 169-70. One need not condone the behavior of Western 
states in order to agree that the UN was in a position to facilitate and coordinate their 
actions. See id. 
50 See id. at 169-71. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 172-75. 
53 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. 
54 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 172. 
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From a historical perspective, the appropriateness of the UN's 
role as human rights protector is also clear.55 The use of the term 
"human rights" in the UN Charter represented the first enumeration 
of that ideal in a major international treaty.56 Also, the UN was the 
institutional force behind the creation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the first instrument of international human rights law 
and one of the twentieth century's most important instruments of in-
ternationallaw.57 In the words of one of the field's most distinguished 
scholars, Professor Henkin, 
[F]or all its inadequacies, the United Nations represents and 
concentrates international concern over human rights. It 
put human rights on the world agenda a half century ago 
and has kept it there. It developed the international law of 
human rights .... It concentrates the world's attention on 
human rights problems that cry for attention.58 
Given this rich history, it would be an irony indeed if the UN, the very 
embodiment of human rights since World War n, would one day 
abandon its responsibility to prevent the most egregious of human 
rights abuses in order to continue to exist for another day. 59 Such ra-
tionalization leads to a circular argument: the UN sat out the Rwan-
dan genocide so it could prevent the next genocide, but if the next 
genocide also proved politically unapproachable, it would not inter-
fere but instead wait for the next genocide .... 60 
C. Could the Absolute Right Have Been Protected Under Existing Norms of 
International Law' 
The UN could have acted to interrupt the genocide in one of two 
waYS.61 The least dramatic, and most feasible (if politically delicate) 
&5 See Louis Henkin, Human mghts: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in REAL-
IZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION '10 IMPACT 3, 16-18 (Samantha Power 
& Graham Allison eds., 2000) [hereinafter REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
56Id. at 9; U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56. 
57 See Henkin, supra note 55, at 11, 12. 
58Id. at 18. 
59 SeeBARNE'IT, supra note 1, at 169-70. 
60 See id. 
61 A crucial factor in UNAMIR's ability to prevent the slaughter of innocents was its 
mandate under the UN Charter. Id. at 70. Authority under Chapter VI creates a traditional 
peacekeeping operation that derives its authority from the consent of the parties. See 
POWER, supra note 1, at 377. A Chapter VII deployment, however, does not require the 
parties' consent and operates as a peace enforcement mission. Id. at 377-78. The UN was 
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means at its disposal was forcefully presenting the moral argument for 
action to member states on the Security Council, which would have 
paved the way for more than a nominal force on the ground in Ki-
gali.62 The presence of an adequately equipped UN force, rather than 
the actual use of force, was a proven deterrent to the Hutu genoci-
daires.63 Yet at the moment reinforcements were most needed, the Se-
curity Council reduced UNAMIR from 2500 to a mere 270 troops, a 
force barely able to protect itself, let alone deter thousands ofkillers.64 
A larger contingent would have been consistent with the parties' re-
quests for assistance in implementing the ceasefire of 1993, and thus 
would have fallen well within the Security Council's discretion under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter.65 
There was ample opportunity for the UN to help establish a 
UNAMIR force large enough to deter the genocidaires, had the Secre-
tariat chosen to act.66 Members of the Secretariat could have actively 
supported the interventionists on the Security Council, rather than 
rationalizing inaction with disingenuous references to the fog of war.67 
Had the Secretariat chosen to emphasize the genocidal aspect of the 
given the role of assigning an "international force" to implement and monitor the peace 
between Rwanda's warring parties in two 1993 protocols known as the Arusha Accords; 
thus, the UN had the parties' consent. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 62. Under this frame-
work, the UN gave UNAMIR its mandate in the form of Security Council Resolution 872, 
which fell within the boundaries of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. [d. at 72; 
POWER, supra note 1, at 377. 
62 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 126. Barnett concludes that while some technicallimi-
tations existed, the main forces leading to the Secretariat's decision not to pursue mean-
ingful intervention were political. [d. at 168. 
6S See id. at 110, 126 (noting that in the first days and weeks ofthe genocide, killing in 
Kigali diminished because of the mere presence of foreign soldiers during the evacuation 
of embassies and nationals); UN REpORT, supra note 8, at 30. The UN Report characterizes 
the lack of resources for UNAMIR as the overriding failure of the UN to bring order to the 
failed Rwandan peace process. UN REpORT, supra note 8, at 30. The report continues: 
"The mission was smaller than the initial recommendations from the field suggested. It was 
slow in being set up, and was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties." [d. Also men-
tioned are a "lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of 
command and control and lack of coordination and discipline." [d. 
64 See id. at 7; POWER, supra note 1, at 369. The UN Report states that the larger, ini-
tially deployed force of 2500 troops should have been able to stop, or at the least limit, the 
massacres that took place after President Habyarimana's plane was downed. UN REpORT, 
supra note 8, at 30. 
M See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 62. Articles 36 and 33 of the UN Charter provide the 
Security Council with the authority to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment" of a dispute, "the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 36. 
66 BARNETT, supra note 1, at 120. 
67 [d. 
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Rwandan crisis, putting the real issue directly in front of policymakers, 
the moral imperative of intervention would have been clear and po-
litically costly to oppose.58 But by deigning to communicate the mili-
tary options recommended by UNAMIR's force commander to the 
Security Council, and by characterizing events on the ground as sim-
ply another lapse into civil war, the Secretariat painted the UN's role 
as conditional interlocutor, not determined peace enforcer.59 Instead 
of persistently presenting the case for intervention, as it had done 
during the Somali famine of 1991-92, the Secretariat, and particularly 
the Secretary-General, refused to put wind into the sails of those who 
were ready and willing to help.7o 
If the mere presence of a sizable UNAMIR had failed to deter the 
genocidaires, the UN could (and should) have invoked its Chapter VII 
powers and used force to stop the massacre. The UN Charter states 
clearly that international law authorizes the use of force under two 
circumstances.71 Under Article 51, force may be employed in self-
defense following an armed attack on one state by another, which was 
not the case in Rwanda.72 Under Article 42, however, force may be 
authorized by the Security Council to restore international peace and 
security.73 As a tiny state in the strategically insignificant center of M-
rica, Rwanda may not have stood out as a threat to international secu-
rity in the minds of UN member states.74 Nonetheless, as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former YUgoslavia case Prosecutor v. 
Tadic states in dictum, it has long been settled practice that under in-
ternationallaw, internal armed conflicts such as the Rwandan geno-
cide can qualifY as "threats to the peace" that may trigger action un-
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 ld. at 119-20. 
71 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 42, 51. 
72 See id. at art. 51. 
7! ld. at art. 42. 
74 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 112. The benefits of hindsight, which Barnett scrupu-
lously avoids, allow this determination to be called into serious question eight years after 
the fact. Conflict between Hutu and Thtsi continues in Burundi and has spread through-
out central Mrica, to include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a civil war that has 
claimed as many as three million lives. Burundi's Civil War: The People Want Peace, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 28, 2002, at 44; A Report from Congo: Africa s Great War, ECONOMIST, July 6, 2002, 
at 43. These conflicts have unquestionably hindered economic development and stability 
in many nations of Central Mrica in the years since the genocide. See Burundis Civil War, 
supra, at 44; A Report from Congo, supra" at 43. 
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der Chapter VII of the UN Charter.75 Thus a persuasive case could 
have been made to the Security Council for an increased mandate to 
match an increasingly desperate situation.76 
D. Did the UN, Aware of the Situation, Choose Another Imperative over the 
Protection of the Absolute Right? 
The UN's actual understanding of the Rwandan crisis and of the 
ramifications of its failure to intervene constitutes the weak link in the 
syllogism because it presents subjective questions that are impossible 
to conclusively answer eight years after the events in question.77 Bar-
nett, however, makes a compelling case that the Secretariat knowingly 
frustrated intervention, one that is supported by other accounts of 
the Rwandan genocide.78 Barnett is quite clear in attributing the Sec-
retariat's silence to a conscious attempt to prevent the self-destruction 
of the UN: 
[T] he Secretariat gave a calculated and staged performance 
that was designed to discourage intervention. Its preferences 
were born not from cynical, immoral, or purely instrumental 
reasons. It rank-ordered its responsibilities and calculated 
the risks associated with different types of actions. There 
were peacekeepers to protect. Also to consider was an or-
ganization that might not survive another failure. Protecting 
the organization from further harm or exploitation was, 
from the Secretariat's view, ethical, legitimate, and desir-
able.79 
III. RWANDA IN CONTEXT 
Part II of this Book Review depicts the UN Secretariat's actions as 
a quintessential example of utilitarianism over absolutism: it chose to 
refrain from intervening in Rwanda in order to protect the UN from 
75 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, *43 (InCI Crim. Trib. for the Former Thgoslavia 
App. Chamber, No. IT-94I-AR72, Oct. 2,1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/ 
appeal! decision-e/5I002.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
76 See BARNETT, supra note I, at 119; see also infra notes 104-107 and accompanying 
text. 
77 See BARNETT, supra note I, at 111. 
78 Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 
365, 440 (1999) .See generally GOUREVITCH, supra note 4; UN REPORT, supra note 8. 
79 BARNETT, supra note I, at 124. 
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self-destruction.80 Genocide, the most horrific abuse of absolute 
rights, did not present an absolute imperative.81 Is this case-study 
unique, or is it an example of a wider failure to protect absolute 
rights? 
As the headline of any newspaper demonstrates, absolute rights 
do not exist in practice; they are nothing more than a theoretical 
idea1.82 Violations of non-derogable rights are widespread and have 
been catalogued all over the world in 2003.83 Slavery and the slave 
trade are alive and well in Mrica and Southeast A-sia.84 State-
sanctioned rape and other forms of torture are rampant in the devel-
oping and developed world.55 Extra-judicial killings have become 
habit for many states' governments.86 Genocide, the most terrible 
human rights violation of all, has claimed the lives of millions in the 
past thirty years.87 
The Rwandan case-study's place in this unhappy tradition is espe-
cially troubling because it presents a stark example of not merely a 
failure but a refusal to protect absolute rights because pt~rceived im-
peratives were deemed more important.88 This utilitarian type of deci-
sion-making is more dangerous to the modern notion of human 
rights than world leaders' apathy or political impotence to act.89 It will 
80 See discussion supra Part II. 
81 See discussion supra Part II. 
82 See discussion supra Part I. The non-existence of absolute rights in practice is noth-
ing new. Indeed, despite the current weakness in the absolute rights regime, more is cur-
rently being done to prevent human rights abuses than at any other time. Henkin, supra 
note 55, at 26-27. 
sg See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REpORT 2003, available atwww.hrw.org/wr2k3 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2003). 
84 See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, My GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME: CHILD SOLDIERS IN 
BURMA (2002) (likening forcible recruitment and severe mistreatment of child soldiers to 
slavery), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); 
Marc Lacey, Panel Led ITy U.S. Criticizes Sudan's Government Over Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 
2002, at A17 (describing the ongoing slave trade in Sudan). 
B6 See AMNESTY INT'L, TAKE A STEP TO STAMP OUT TORTURE 26 (2000), available at 
www.amnesty.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). 
86 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE: TORTURE, "DISAPPEARANCE," ANIl 
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION IN MEXICO (1999), available at www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ 
mexico/index.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003). 
87 See generally POWER, supra note 1. In addition to the roughly 800,000 lost in Rwanda, 
Power recounts the deaths of two million Cambodians from 1975-78; 100,000 Iraqi Kurds 
from 1987-88; and 200,000 Bosnians from 1992-95. Id. at 89-90, 172, 440. These figures 
do not include the substantial number of persons forcibly expelled from their homelands, 
which, in the case of the Kosovar Albanians, was as high as 1.3 million. Id. at 450. 
88 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 127-28. 
89 See id. 
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allow policymakers to continue to demote absolute rights in the fu-
ture through the considered balancing of priorities.90 Such decision-
making critically undermines absolute rights, which, by their very na-
ture, must be paramount.91 If policy decisions continue to be made on 
the basis of the cold calculation practiced by the UN during the 
Rwandan genocide, absolute rights will be relegated to permanent 
theoretical statuS.92 Such a class of protections, which has rhetorical 
power but no practical usefulness, makes for fine intellectual scholar-
ship and lofty debate, but does little to actually effectuate the goals of 
the human rights movement-to protect human rights.9!l 
Policymakers must give absolute rights a more prominent posi-
tion on the diplomatic and political scales of decision-making if such 
rights are to retain their relevance in human rights discourse.94 A 
number of considerations support this shift in priorities. First is the 
moral imperative posed by absolute rights violations, especially those 
committed on a massive scale, as in Rwanda.95 Western states and in-
tergovernmental organizations capable of preventing such catastro-
phes have a moral obligation to humanity to do SO.96 Second is en-
lightened self-interest by policymakers, in terms of the havoc massive 
rights violations invariably wreak on prospects for economic develop-
ment, and on regional and global stability.97 Third is the need to ad-
dress society's broad acceptance of absolute rights as meaningful and 
enforceable protections. Each of the principal human rights treaties, 
so-described by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has 
been ratified by over two-thirds of the world's nations.98 Presumably, 
90 See id. 
9! See discussion supra Part I. 
SI! See BARNETT, supra note I, at 127-28. 
95 See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, MISSION STATEMENT (affirming that the goal of Human 
Rights Watch, the largest human rights organization based in the United States, is to 
change states' policies and practices that abuse or degrade human rights), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). 
94 See POWER, supra note I, at 508-10. Elevating a theoretical concept such as absolute 
rights to the fore of political decision-making invariably sacrifices other policy objectives, 
and can even, in the long-run, thwart the goals of human rights by promoting idealism 
over practical results. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Mr. Bush ~ Liberal Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2003, at A23. For this reason, this book review limits its call for creating policy absolutes to 
protecting against the most egregious human rights violations, those that should never, for 
any reason, be allowed: genocide, slavery, and torture (including rape). See id. 
95 See POWER, supra note I, at 512. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS 
OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AS OF 9 
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people in many countries support such legal instruments out of a not-
unrealistic expectation that they will actually have binding force.99 
This existence and under-application of international human rights 
law leads to a paradox appraisal of the current human rights re-
gime.Ioo There is ample cause for frustration because the law is not 
applied. There is, however, cause for hope. Given such a theoretically 
powerful array of human rights protections, all that is needed to pro-
tect absolute rights is the political will to apply the many tools that are 
already in place.IOI 
There is limited but hopeful evidence that a real commitment to 
absolute rights has begun to take root among policymakers at the na-
tional and international level. For instance, the drive toward holding 
absolute rights violators accountable has seen remarkable progress in 
the past ten years, with the creation of UN tribunals for Rwanda and 
the former fugoslavia, a hybrid tribunal for East Timor, a Special 
Court for Sierre Leone, and a newly established International Crimi-
nal Court.I02 
More promising still is a recent instance of preventative, rather 
than reactive, absolute rights protection. In 1999 NATO led a bomb-
ing campaign against targets in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia to 
prevent the genocide against Bosnians in the early- to mid-1990s from 
being repeated against Kosovar Albanians. IOS In the scholarly debates 
that followed the air-strikes, which were launched without Security 
Council authorization, one prominent commentator proposed that 
NATO's action marked a new state practice in humanitarian interven-
DECEMBER (2002) (displaying ratification information for the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (146 state parties); the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (149 state parties); the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (165 state parties); the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (170 state parties); the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (132 state parties); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (191 state par-
ties», available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 132-33; Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes 
Reality. Without u.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12. 2002. at A3. 
105 See Ruth Wedgwood. NATO's Campaip;n in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 829 
(1999). By the time the decision to use military force was made, the Serbs had already 
deported hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and killed as many as 
ten thousand. [d. 
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tion beyond the traditional confines of in ternationallaw.I04 According 
to this theory, NATO's air campaign could be the first step in the de-
velopment of a new legal custom whereby Security Council authoriza-
tion for military action would prove unnecessary in certain circum-
stances. I05 A humanitarian intervention argument that adheres more 
closely to the current confines of international law has been made by 
the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan. I06 Ever since UN mem-
ber states failed to speak with one voice during the Kosovo crisis, An-
nan has forcefully argued that traditional notions of state sovereignty 
should never again prevent the Security Council from voting to con-
front massive human rights violations, through force if necessary.I07 
Human rights pundits naturally recoil at any suggestion that human 
rights should be protected by military intervention, which itself in-
variably entails many human rights violations,l08 However, while the 
means of intervention in Kosovo arguably should have been more 
sensitive to human rights concerns, its ends were undeniably humani-
tarian.109 
104 See id. at 828. Professor Wedgwood suggests that although current international law 
only allows force to be employed in self-defense or with Security Council authorization, the 
Kosovo intervention may stand for the proposition that a limited, conditional right to hu-
manitarian intervention exists when the Security Council does not explicitly oppose it (no 
vote was taken), and the intervening force is a respected multilateral organization (such as 
NATO). Seeid. 
105 See Wedgwood, supra note 103, at 828. 
106 See, e.g., Kofi Annan, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention in the Twenty-First 
Century, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 309, 315. 
107 See id. But see Franklin Foer, Turtle Dove: How Koft Annan Fooled the Bushies, THE NEW 
REpUBLIC, Oct. 14, 2002, at 20 (arguing that Annan's skittish record as head of the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide undermines his 
current campaign for the primacy of human rights over state sovereignty). Annan argues 
that humanitarian intervention should continue to take place under the traditional, UN-
oriented view of international law. See Annan, supra note 106, at 315. Thus states would 
require Security Council authorization before using military force in times of humanitar-
ian catastrophe. See id; U.N. CHARTER art. 42. This is in marked contrast to Professor 
Wedgwood's progressive theory of humanitarian intervention. See supra notes 103, 104 and 
accompanying text. In either case, state sovereignty remains one of the thorniest obstacles 
to preventing massive rights violations. See id. 
108 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CIVILIAN DEA'IRS IN 'IRE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN (2000) (con-
cluding that approximately 500 Thgoslav civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing 
of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo in 1999), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2000/ 
nato/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003); see also See Richard A Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the 
Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 848 (1999) (exploring the seemingly 
intractable collision that takes place in humanitarian intervention: the absolute of geno-
cide prevention comes into conflict with the absolute that killing civilians during war is 
wrong). 
109 See Peter Beinart, A Separate Peace, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Mar. 3, 2003, at 6 (describing 
America's post-Cold War "altruistic interventions" in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo). 
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Although the willingness to use force exists as a last resort, it is 
important to note that the most effective prevention of absolute rights 
abuse does not require such drastic measures as military interven-
tion.no In extreme cases such as genocide or widespread enslavement, 
allowing a conflict to fester until the international community must 
intervene with force relegates policymakers to the most expensive, 
dangerous, and unpopular option.11l Military intervention is merely a 
failure of prevention, as Rwanda demonstrates.ll2 In smaller-scale in-
stances of absolute rights abuse, such as torture during police interro-
gations, protecting absolute rights would simply require states and 
intergovernmental organizations to give effect to their rhetorical as-
sertions of support for human rights ideals in their policymaking and 
rights enforcement.ll3 
A renewed emphasis on enforcing absolute rights is needed to fill 
a conspicuous void in the daily functioning of human rights law.114 As 
one commentator in particular has observed, human rights law has 
largely failed to directly and proactively prevent rights violations, in-
Id. 
110 Annan, supra note 106, at 314. Annan states: 
The most effective interventions are not military. It is much better, from 
every point of view, if action can be taken to resolve or manage a conflict be-
fore it reaches the military stage. Sometimes this action may take the form of 
"carrots," such as economic advice and assistance; sometimes of "sticks," tar-
geted sanctions. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 316. 
m See AMNES'IY INT'L, supra note 85, at 87. A number of solutions to the violation of 
the absolute right to freedom from torture have been proposed, including immigration 
policies that prohibit deportation of those likely to suffer torture in their states of origin, 
the "mobilization of shame" against institutions and governments that regularly employ 
torture, and sensitive treatment and investigation of victims' claims of torture. Id. at 100, 
107, 112. The first of these proposals is already required by international law for state par-
ties to the Torture Convention. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Punishment or Treatment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, 27 I.L.M. 
1027 (entered into force June 26,1987). As is the case with many absolute rights, however, 
there is a yawning gap between the law as written and the law as enforced. See generally Kris-
ten B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Thaty that Pre-
vents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Remova~ 26 DENV. J. INT'L 
L. & POL'y 533 (1998) (identifying the difficulty faced by appellant deportees when the 
Torture Convention is interpreted by U.S. courts as non-self executing, and hence, inca-
pable on its own of preventing deportees' removal to countries that are likely to torture 
them). 
114 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 132. 
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stead making advances indirectly and over time.U5 By providing a 
common language, reinforcing the universality of human rights, and 
legitimizing claims of rights, human rights law has gradually contrib-
uted to the broad goals of human rights.u6 These indirect advances 
approach the problem of human rights abuse peripherally, compared 
to the direct advance this Book Review supports: actually preventing 
the most serious rights abuse through considered policymaking.1l7 
While indirect advances have doubtless contributed to the current 
human rights landscape, defending absolute rights must mean more 
than slowly incorporating human rights ideals into the collective con-
science of the world's polities.u8 In addition to touting international 
human rights law's indirect benefits, the indirect rights theory con-
cedes that human rights law's direct impact has been limited to a few 
scattered successes.U9 Even these triumphs have been largely reactive 
rather than proactive; they seek to punish rights violators rather than 
prevent abusive behavior in the first place. l20 Genocide is a represen-
tative example of that class of human rights violations whose moral 
urgency requires a plan of action un til the great day when the indirect 
effects of human rights law have advanced to the stage where they can 
protect people in a crisiS.121 
CONCLUSION 
The UN's failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, 
as portrayed by Eyewitness to a Genocide, is an illustrative example of a 
widespread failure to protect absolute rights. 122 It evidences a yawning 
115 See id. at 122. One of the most important indirect effects of human rights law is the 
development of customary international law through initially non-binding declarations of 
support for human rights. See, e.g., David A. Martin, How Rhetoric Became Rights, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 1. 1998. at C2 (arguing that the gradual development of the ideals expressed in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into customary international law is one of the 
great triumphs of the human rights movement). 
116 See Cassel. supra note 15. at 126-27. The language issue posed a significant barrier 
in Rwanda; there. as in other cases of genocide, avoidance of the term "genocide" allowed 
policymakers to sidestep the legal, moral. and political imperative to act. See POWER, supra 
note 1. at 359 (recounting a Defense Department discussion paper that warned against the 
use of the term: "Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday-genocide 
finding could commit [the U.S.] to actually 'do something.'"). 
117 SeeCassel, supra note 15. at 126-27. 
118 See id. at 123. 
119 Id. at 132-33. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 128. 
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gap between the theoretical notion of absolute rights and a sorely 
needed enforcement of rights protections in practice.123 This Book 
Review responds to this divide by arguing that absolute rights should 
be elevated to the fore of decision-making and protected by enforcing 
existing legal norms.124 
It may be a tautology to announce that the way to enforce abso-
lute rights is simply to apply existing laws.125 But that tautology is so-
bering when accompanied by Rwanda's stark reminder that without 
enforcement, the fine tradition of legal and philosophical debate over 
absolute rights is only so much theory.126 In order to prevent future 
human rights catastrophes like the Rwandan genocide, absolute rights 
must be accorded primacy by decision-makers. This would reflect 
their moral and practical importance, as well as their venerable status 
in the eyes of the citizens of the world.127 
123 See Samantha Power & Graham Allison, Introduction to REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 55, at xv. 
124 See discussion supra Part m. 
125 See discussion supra Part m. 
126 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
127 See discussion supra Part m. 
